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Forthcoming in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:  LESSONS AFTER 20
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE (Jody Freeman and Charles Kolstad eds. Oxford University Press)
©Oxford University Press & David M. Driesen
1 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:
The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 183 (1988); Daniel J.
Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is this Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 217, 234-235 (1988); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based
Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 13 (1991);
Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 153, 160 (1988); Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Global Climate
Change: How Can Governments Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293, 302-
03.  See also Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Policy and Technological Change, 22 ENVTL
& RESOURCE ECON. 41, 51 (2002) (economic incentives stimulate innovation by paying firms to
clean up “a bit more”).
2 I have advanced both of the claims previously.  See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions
Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic
Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 313-322, 325-338 (1998) [hereinafter
Driesen, Dichotomy]; David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading
Idea and the Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (1998) [hereinafter
Driesen, Cheap Fix].
3 See, e.g., Byron Swift, The Acid Rain Test, 14 ENVTL. F., May/June 1997, at 17
(describing fuel switching and use of scrubbers as innovations from the acid rain program). 
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DESIGN, TRADING, AND INNOVATION
David M. Driesen
Proponents of “economic incentives” frequently state that emissions trading promotes
technological innovation.1  This chapter examines the claim that this trading of compliance
obligations fosters innovation.  While I use the term “emissions trading” throughout for the sake
of concreteness, the claims made here apply fully to other kinds of environmental benefit
trading. 
This chapter makes two theoretical claims and two empirical claims.  The first theoretical
claim is that emissions trading does a poorer job, in theory, of encouraging expensive innovation
than traditional regulation.  I will also argue that expensive innovation has special value that
justifies the expense in some important cases.  The second theoretical claim is that emissions
trading may perform worse than traditional regulation in encouraging inexpensive innovation as
well, at least in theory.2  
My first empirical claim is that both emissions trading and traditional regulation have
sometimes encouraged innovation and sometimes failed to do so.  My second claim is that we do
not have convincing empirical evidence that trading fosters innovation better than a comparably
designed traditional regulation.  
A casual review of the literature might lead one to assume that emissions trading’s
advantages in encouraging innovation are well established both in theory and empirically.3  The
4 See, e.g., Joel F. Bruneau, A Note on Permits, Standards, and Technological Innovation,
48 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MAN. 1192 (2004); Juan-Pablo Montero, Permits, Standards, and
Technology Innovation, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MAN. 23 (2002); Juan- Pablo Montero, Market
Structure and Environmental Innovation, 5 J. APPLIED ECON. 293 (2002) (trading, taxes, or
traditional regulation can best encourage research and development when firms’ products are
strategic substitutes).  See also David A. Malueg, Emissions Credit Trading and the Incentive to
Adopt New Pollution Abatement Technology, 16 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MAN. 52 (1987) (pointing
out the error and offering a correction); W. A. Magat, Pollution Control and Technological
Advance:  A Dynamic Model of the Firm, 5 J. ENV’T. ECON. & MGMT. 95 (1978).
5 See, e.g., Suzi Kerr & Richard Newell, Policy-Induced Technology Adoption: Evidence
from the U.S. Lead Phasedown, 51 J. INDUS. ECON. 317, 320 (2003) (“We find that increased
stringency . . . encouraged greater adoption of lead reducing technology”).
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theory many academics mention most often, I will argue, focuses too much attention on the
incentives trading creates for sellers of credits and pays too little attention to the incentives
created for buyers.  It also relies upon a skewed picture of traditional regulation created by
academic lawyers.  In light of these problems with the basis for the trading encouraging
innovation argument, it is not surprising that some economists have recently questioned the
premise that emissions trading always provides superior incentives for innovation.4  
The empirical case, I will argue, is much more difficult than generally assumed.  The
choice between authorizing and not authorizing trading is not the only variable in a regulation
that influences innovation.  Decisions about the form and stringency of limits are also
important.5  It is difficult to tell whether innovation observed in conjunction with a trading
program would have occurred with a performance standard providing identical emission limits,
but not authorizing trading.  The empirical literature has not always rigorously considered
counterfactuals in assessing trading program’s capacity to encourage innovation.  
I limit these claims to “grandfathered” trading programs in which allowances are given
away rather than sold.  Whether or not polluters can trade allowances, a requirement that all
polluters purchase allowances for each ton of pollution can create incentives to innovate and
reduce pollution.  This chapter, however, focuses on emissions trading programs that give away
limited allowances for free, and then authorize trades to redistribute them. I choose this approach
because all existing United States pollution trading programs give away, rather than sell, the
overwhelming majority of allowances, and because this focus sharpens analysis of trading’s
effect on innovation.
The first part of this chapter will establish some background concepts.  It will define
innovation, explain its value, and establish an analytical framework that will inform the rest of
the chapter  This analytical framework posits that to compare a trading program to a traditional
regulation, we need to compare programs with identical underlying emission limits.  More
widespread use of this framework will improve the rigor of both theoretical and empirical
analysis.
6 See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe et al., Technological Change and the Environment, in THE
HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 464-65 (Jeffrey Vincent ed., 2003). 
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The next two parts defend the theoretical and then the empirical claims.  The fourth part
explains the analysis’ implications.  I argue that we need to consider more imaginative use of
economic incentives with an explicit goal of encouraging innovation, rather than short-term
efficiency.  I also spell out a research agenda suggested by the analytical framework and
subsequent analysis.     
I.  Innovation and Trading: A Framework
A.  Defining Innovation
Most of the literature claiming that emissions trading fosters innovation does not define
innovation.  Economists frequently define innovation as the commercialization of an invention.6 
They distinguish this from diffusion - the adoption of a successful innovation by firms or
individuals.  
 
This definition of innovation as commercialization separate from invention jibes less well
with common understandings of what innovation connotes in the environmental area than it does
in the production of goods.  For most people, innovation involves some non-obvious change. 
But a definition of innovation as commercialization might accept uses of very well understood,
but not yet widely deployed, pollution reducing technique as “innovation.”  If this were the case,
then a lot of command-and-control regulation would be seen as innovation inducing, because it
has frequently spurred use of well understood, but little used, technological options.  But the
policy literature usually treats adoption of techniques well understood by regulators or polluting
firms as diffusion, not innovation.     
 For this reason, I define innovation as involving both the invention and use of something
new.  Newness, however, means something more than “it has not been done” before by a
particular company or even industry. A company with no environmental controls may adopt
standard, well-established techniques used in the past by their competitors or by another
industry. This normally involves technological diffusion, not technological innovation.   
Innovation implies a non-obvious departure from prior practice, to borrow a concept
found in patent law.  Innovation in this sense advances the state of the art. As we shall see,
innovation defined in this manner has special value.  I will refer to this as the “Newness”
definition.  This definition implies that a regulatory program induces innovation when a polluter
or vendor develops a new technique in response to that program and then a polluter uses the
technique to reduce pollution, but does not generally accept diffusion of techniques invented 
before the program’s onset as innovations.    
A second concept will also prove useful here, that of Radical Innovation.  Radical
Innovation in the environmental area addresses multiple pollution problems simultaneously and
changes fundamental technologies at the base of the economy, not just end-of-the-pipe controls. 
7 See id. at 467 (finding it difficult to distinguish innovation from diffusion using a
“commercialization” definition).
8 DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 78-80
(MIT Press 2003).
9 For a definition of environmental innovation, see id. at 77-78. Cf. Richard B. ,
Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV.
1256, 1279 (1981) (distinguishing between market and social innovation).
10 David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality: The Need to Replace
Basic Technologies with Cleaner Alternatives, 32 ELR 10277, 10280, 10284 (Mar. 2002)
(detailing contributions to air pollution from vehicles and power plants and the persistence of
outmoded technologies); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE (ELI), CLEANER POWER: THE
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF MOVING FROM COAL GENERATION TO MODERN POWER
TECHNOLOGIES (2001).
4
Examples might include switches from fossil fuels to renewable energy and from pesticide-based
agriculture to organic agriculture or genetically modified crops.  
The need to distinguish innovation from diffusion to analyze instrument choice’s
influence upon innovation makes empirical research difficult no matter what definition is
employed.7  The Newness Definition implies a need to assess the novelty of a technological
changes.  This chapter’s references to innovation will apply the “Newness” definition unless
otherwise stated.  It will assume that “Radical Innovation” is a subset of innovations found under
the “Newness” rubric. 
B.  The Importance of Innovation
Innovation can perform one of two basic functions. It can lower the cost of a product or
increase its quality.8 Computers with word processing programs, for example, cost much more
than pen and paper or a typewriter, but offer a much higher quality writing aid, making revision
relatively easy. 
So too with environmental innovation.9 Innovation can reduce the cost of pollution
control or make it possible to perform basic economic functions with less pollution than existing
approaches.  In other words, environmental innovation can either offer qualitatively better
environmental results or reduce the cost of achieving a particular result. 
 In The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law (MIT Press 2003), I argue that this
former “qualitative” function has immense importance.  We suffer from continued air pollution
problems and worsening climate change largely because we remain addicted to very old basic
technologies such as coal-fired power plants and gasoline-burning car engines.10 Pollution from
cars and power plants bears a major portion of the responsibility for tens of thousands of annual
deaths from air pollution, millions of cases of asthma, cancer risks, reproductive toxicity risk,
11 Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation by Incentives: Myths, Models, and Micromarkets, 80
TEX. L. REV. 531, 541 (2002) (innovation can ease “the way for broader environmental
improvements.”). Cf. Jaffe et al., supra note 1, at 54-55 (noting that cost-saving innovation may
make optimal environmental policy more stringent).
12 See, e.g., Jaffe et al., supra note 1, at 49.
13 See Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 2, at 291-92. See, e.g. Royal C. Gardner, Banking
on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 81 IOWA L. REV. 527 (1996)
(reviewing an intertemporal trading program for wetlands conservation); David M. Driesen,
Choosing Environmental Instruments in a Transnational Context, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 (2000)
(discussing international application of emissions trading); Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen
Pollution on Long Island Sound: Is There a Place for Pollutant Trading?, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 137 (1998) (discussing proposal to use nitrogen trading regionally to control water pollution).
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widespread destruction of ecosystems, and global climate change (which may produce rising
seas, a spread of infectious diseases, eco-system harms, and, in places, drought and starvation). 
Because of this we may need “Radical Innovation” to address these problems
comprehensively in the economically dynamic world we live in--a dynamic world of growing
population, increased consumption, and fierce lobbying fueled by the proceeds of increased
consumption.  This economic dynamic tends to make environmental problems grow over time.
This dynamic almost always undermines some of the progress environmental regulation would
otherwise bring about, and, at times, leads to absolute declines in environmental quality.
Technological innovation generally (not just radical innovation) also performs an
important political function--making progress possible where it otherwise could not occur.11 The
climate change regime, for example, assumes that the richer countries will develop and share the
technologies that will make it possible for relatively poor countries to enjoy a good quality of
life and contribute to efforts to address climate change.  Absent this sort of developed country
leadership, developed countries may have great difficulty persuading tomorrow’s greatest
greenhouse gas emitters, such as China and India, to reduce emissions to tolerable levels. 
We need to reframe the environmental policy debate around the question of addressing
the economic dynamics of environmental law.  This involves, among other things, asking how
we can design environmental law that stimulates environmental innovation as effectively as we
currently stimulate material innovation (some of which is environmentally destructive).  In any
case, environmental policy analysts generally agree upon the desirability of stimulating
technological innovation to improve the environment.12  But the emphasis upon “dynamic
efficiency” in the trading literature tends to emphasize the cost saving advantages of innovation,
while drawing attention away from the “qualitative” advantages.
 Emissions trading has been widely implemented.13 Hence, the question of whether it
encourages innovation matters a great deal.
14 The economics literature sometimes uses the term “emissions standard” to refer to a
rate-based standard and the term “performance standard” to refer to a mass-based standard.  See
Bruneau, supra note 4 at 1193 n. 1.  The Clean Air Act, however, defines both these terms much
more broadly.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(k) (defining an “emission standard” as any standard that
limits air pollution, including both numerical standards and instructions about what techniques to
use); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(h), 7602(l) (defining a performance standard as either a rate-based or
6
C.  An Analytical Framework for Comparing Trading and Non-Trading Programs
When not analyzing emissions trading, economists commonly employ the “induced
innovation hypothesis” - an assumption that high cost will tend to encourage innovation.  This
hypothesis would suggest that more stringent regulation would induce more innovation than less
stringent regulation.  Stringent regulation (with or without trading) raises the cost of routine
compliance and creates an incentive to innovate in order to escape the high cost.
This observation has implications for the analysis of emissions trading programs, because
all trading programs involve government decisions about stringency.  While policy-makers
sometimes act as if trading programs offer an alternative to regulation, experts in the area
understand that trading is a variant upon an ordinary performance standard.  To establish a
trading program, government officials must establish a set of performance standards for
regulated pollution sources, just as they would if they were establishing a traditional regulation. 
When a regulator permits a regulated polluter to forego local compliance with the performance
standard if she purchases equivalent reductions from elsewhere, she has created a trading
program.  The trading program still contains pollution limits reflecting a policy choice about the
amount of reductions to demand, but it introduces flexibility about the location of the reductions. 
 Since stringency decisions can influence the amount of innovation, isolating the effect of
permission to trade on innovation requires comparison of programs with equivalent stringency.  
Let’s assume that one state demands a 70% reduction from power plants through an emissions
trading program and another demands a 50% reduction from power plants through a set of
source specific performance standards.  Assume that the power plants were identical in all
respects prior to regulation and that the emissions trading program induced more innovation than
the performance standard program.  One could not assume that the trading produced the
innovation.  One would have to at least consider the possibility that the difference in stringency
accounted for the difference in innovation rates.  
Another important variable involves the form of standards.  The acid rain program
trading program, the phase out of ozone depleting chemicals (which I treat as a traditional
regulation, because nobody seems to have used the trading provisions), and the most recent new
source performance standard for power plants (which do not allow trading) feature mass-based
limits.  Most emissions trading programs (e.g. the open market trading programs in the states, the
bubbles, and mobile source emissions trading programs) and traditional regulations, however,
use rate-based limits.  Mass-based limits will tend to induce more innovation than rate-based
limits, because they do not allow pollution levels to rise when production increases.  Hence, the
form of standards provides another potentially significant variable.14
mass-based numerical limit on air pollution, as opposed to a “work practice” standard that
dictates technological choice).     
15 See Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 2, at 334; Kerr & Newell, supra note 5, at 319
(relatively high-cost plants will have decreased incentives to adopt technology under a trading
system). 
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A valid comparison between a trading program and a non-trading program should
compare programs having emission limits of identical stringency and form.  To isolate trading’s
effect on innovation, one has to ask whether an emissions trading program induces more
innovation than a comparably designed traditional performance standard.  
II.  The Theoretical Claims
The induced innovation hypothesis suggests that emissions trading discourages
innovation.  Since it lowers the cost of routine compliance, it would seem to reduce the impetus
to innovate.  High costs encourage innovation, low costs discourage it.  So, a trading program
should produce less innovation than a comparably designed traditional regulation.    
Oddly though, the economics literature on trading generally does not analyze the
implications of the induced innovation hypothesis.  I will first discuss the theory supporting the
claim in the literature that emissions trading encourages innovation.  I will then support my
claim that trading discourages high cost innovation.  Finally, I will discuss the more difficult
claim, that traditional regulation might induce more low cost innovation than a comparably
designed trading program.   
A.  The Existing Theory
It is common for the selection of the unit of analysis to influence results in economic
theory and in other realms.  This is certainly true of emissions trading.  
Imagine an argument against emissions trading’s capacity to stimulate innovation that
went like this: In an emissions trading program, some polluters emit more than their allowable
emissions; therefore, these polluters have less of an incentive to innovate than they would have
under a traditional program and emissions trading decreases incentives to innovate.  Let’s assess
this argument. 
 
Well, emissions trading does provide an incentive for some polluters to emit more than
they would under a traditional regulation.15   But those polluters must pay other polluters to make
extra emission reductions to make up the gap.  Resting a model of emissions trading upon the
experience of only half of the polluters (the buyers of credits) in the market skews the results.
This model leaves the sellers of emission credits, who make extra reductions to sell to the
buyers, out of the picture. It is obviously incomplete. 
16 See Malueg, supra note 4, at 8-9 & n.33.
17 See id.; Jaffe et al., supra note 1, at 51 (“market-based instruments can provide
powerful incentives for companies to adopt cheaper and better pollution-control technologies . . .
because . . . with market-based instruments, it pays firms to clean up a bit more . . .).
18 See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 1, at 8-9 & n.33 (describing trading’s tendency to seek
equilibrium). See generally J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRICES 92-100 (1968). 
19 See Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 2, at 334; Driesen, Cheap Fix, supra note 2, at 43.
20 See Malueg, supra note 4.
21 Id. at 54-56.
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If we change the unit of analysis, we can flip this result.  The argument would go like
this: Polluters have an incentive to make extra emission reductions under emissions trading so
that they can sell credits;16 therefore, emissions trading stimulates innovation. 
This model accurately explains the situation of sellers of credits. But it is also obviously
incomplete. It leaves the buyers of credits out of the picture. While emissions trading encourages
sellers to decrease emissions below the levels a comparable traditional regulation, trading
encourages buyers to increase their emissions above what a traditional regulation allows. 
The seller-based model, incomplete as it is, actually forms the theoretical predicate for
the standard argument that emissions trading encourages innovation.17 Basing an economic
model only upon the seller’s decrease of emissions amounts to treating emissions trading as a
program that generates extra net emission reductions.  If emissions trading did that, obviously it
would create a greater net incentive for innovation.  For stricter regulation demands more than
laxer regulation and, therefore, heightens incentives for innovation. But an emissions trading
program does not generate more net emissions reductions than a comparable traditional
regulation. 
If the market functions perfectly, then an emissions trading program produces precisely
the same amount of reductions that a traditional regulation with the same emission limits would
produce, no more and no less.18 Emissions trading shifts emission reductions, concentrating the
same number of reductions among the facilities with the lowest pollution reduction costs.19 The
right question is whether this shift of reductions from high-cost to low-cost facilities encourages
innovation.
I am not the first scholar to point out the incompleteness of a seller-based analysis.  In
1987, David Malueg, now of Tulane University’s economics department, wrote an article in the
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management discussing the incompleteness of the
seller-based model.20 He argued that an economic model of emissions trading must recognize
that some polluters make more reductions under a trading regime than they would under a
traditional regulation, and some polluters make less.21 This argument seems irrefutable. Indeed,
22 See Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 2, at 337.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 334 (employing the Malueg model); DAVID WALLACE, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: STRATEGIES IN EUROPE, THE U.S.A., AND JAPAN 20
(1995) (explaining that Malueg’s “more sophisticated model” casts doubt on the claim that
emissions trading necessarily spurs innovation); Malloy, supra note 11, at 543 n.33 (discussing
Malueg as suggesting that emissions trading may cause a decrease in research and development
in pollution reducing technology); Kerr & Newell, supra note 5, at 319 (employing the Malueg
model as part of a very sophisticated analysis of the lead trading program); Hahn & Stavins,
supra note 1, at 8-9 n.33 (pointing out, consistent with Malueg, that trading encourages
abatement by some sources, while encouraging high cost sources to increase emissions); Robert
P. Anex, Stimulating Innovation in Green Technology: Policy Alternatives and Opportunities, 44
AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 188, 201 (2002) (market incentives do not necessarily improve
incentives for innovation); Chuhlo Jung et al., Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement
Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives, 30 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 95, 95 (1996) (“marketable permits may not provide greater incentives than standards,
because the incentive effects of marketable permits depend on whether firms are buyers and
sellers.”); V. Kerry Smith & Randy Walsh, Do Painless Environmental Policies Exist?, 21 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 73, 75-76 (2000) (addressing the Malueg model); Michael Grubb &
David Ulph, Energy, the Environment, and Innovation, 18 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 92, 104
(2002) (expressing lack of confidence in environmental policy’s ability to encourage innovation
without a technology policy). See also Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Pollution Permits
and Environmental Innovation, 62 J. PUB. ECON. 127, 128 (1996) (permits can create
“inefficiencies with regard to innovation”).
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the desire of some polluters to avoid otherwise required reductions generates the demand for
“extra” emission decreases that drives emissions trading. In a real sense, emission increases
(above otherwise required levels) finance emission decreases in an emissions trading program.22
For the savings realized by not making expensive reductions at buyers’ own facilities finance the
purchase of credits that drives the market.23 
It is not clear why a measure that reduces innovation incentives for some facilities and
increases them for others will lead to an increase in overall levels of innovation among facilities
subject to a regulation. And the relevant question for public policy, of course, must address
overall levels of innovation, not just of a chosen subset of facilities.
Economists have recently have begun to use Malueg’s model to analyze emissions
trading’s influence upon technological change; and they acknowledge that  Malueg’s model
casts doubt on the thesis that emissions trading without auctioned allowances encourages
innovation.24  The selection of a seller-based model would be  systematically biased toward the
position that emissions trading encourages innovation, just as the selection of a buyer-based
model would be systematically biased toward the conclusion that emissions trading discourages
innovation.  Hence, economists are right to be giving increased attention to the Malueg
25 See Malloy, supra note 11, at 542-543; Driesen, Cheap Fix, supra note 2, at 42 (buyers
will purchase cheap credits). 
26 See, e.g., Julie Edelson Halpert, Harnessing the Sun and Selling it Abroad: U.S. Solar
Industry in Export Boom, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1996, at D1; Jaffe et al., supra note 6, at 490 
(discussing economic models predicated upon falling abatement costs from “learning by doing”);
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), Acting as the Preparatory Committee for the
World Summit on Sustainable Development, Energy, and Transport: Report of the Secretary
General, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.17/2001/PC/20 (2000) (price of solar photovoltaic modules has
come down about 25%).
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framework.
B.  Why Trading Discourages Costly Innovation
Emissions trading disfavors costly innovation. Emissions trading creates an incentive for
a polluter facing high control cost to purchase credits that cost less than the cost of control at the
buyer’s facility.25 Furthermore, the buyer has an incentive to purchase the cheapest credits
possible. Knowing this, rational sellers will only generate credits that cost less to produce than:
1) the control cost of prospective buyers; and 2) credits with which the seller must compete. 
Emissions trading by lowering the cost of compliance, restricts the price range of innovations
that are economically rational.
Thus trading rules out the purchase of credits generated by relatively expensive
innovation (i.e. higher than the equilibrium price created in a trading regime).  But that raises the
question of whether expensive innovation is desirable.  In answering that question, we should
bear in mind that useful innovations often follow a path where they cost a lot at the outset, but
the costs of using innovations fall as producers learn better production techniques and realize
savings through economies of scale.26 Thus, an expensive innovation might function as an
investment in future cheap reductions.  The emissions trading market does not encourage such
investments because the buyer of credits chooses the cheapest current reductions, not
considering societal cost savings in the future.  Because today’s luxury goods often become
tomorrow’s important technological advance (e.g. computers), this failure to stimulate advanced
technologies may be detrimental in the long run.  
Furthermore, radical innovations, which might be expensive, offer a qualitative
improvement that makes them quite worthwhile, even if they do cost more.  Thus, for example, a
technology that produces a whole raft of environmental benefits may prove valuable even if it
does not offer the cheapest current method of obtaining the benefit sought by a targeted
emissions trading program. 
Innovations that decrease reliance upon fossil fuels offer both this qualitative superiority
and the possibility of future cost savings. Renewable energy technologies have experienced rapid
declines in prices as production has increased, even though they have never achieved the scale
27 See, e.g., CSD, supra note 26, at 4 (discussing declines in prices of solar photovoltaic
modules); JAMES MCVEIGH ET AL., WINNER, LOSER, OR INNOCENT VICTIM?: HAS
RENEWABLE ENERGY PERFORMED AS EXPECTED (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper
99-28, 1999).
28 See DRIESEN, supra note 5, at 34-35.
29 In fact, the case is not completely iron clad. The lead trading case may demonstrate that
notwithstanding the drag trading may place on innovation, sufficiently stringent limits will force
innovation if they cannot be met without it. If one reduces pollution to zero, innovation often
must take place. While trading can retard the pace of innovation, as it did in the lead case, it will
not prevent it. See Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 2, at 317 n.131.
30 See Richard G. Newell et al., The Induced Innovation Hypothesis and Energy-Saving
Technological Change, 114 Q. J. ECON. 941 (1999). Cf. Malloy, supra note 11, at 546 (linking
the induced innovation idea to the idea that traditional regulation may induce innovation)
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that might facilitate really enormous reductions in price.27 And renewable technologies promise
relief not just from a particular air pollutant, but from a host of pollutants, associated destruction
of land from drilling and mining, water pollution, and much else besides.28 Yet, emissions
trading tends to favor low-cost solutions, like better scrubbers and catalysts, to environmentally
and economically superior solutions for the long haul.  
C.  Trading and Low-Cost Innovation
While the case against emissions trading as a method to stimulate expensive but
potentially invaluable environmental innovation seems simple, irrefutable, and very strong, the
question of whether it provides superior incentives for cost reducing innovation is more
complex.29 I now turn to that question.
1.  The Theory of Trading
In theory, emissions trading may weaken net incentives for innovation.  If a regulation
allows facilities to use trading to meet standards, then the low-cost facilities will tend to provide
more of the total reductions than they would provide under a comparable traditional regulation.
Conversely, the high-cost facilities will tend to provide less of the total required reductions than
they would under a comparable traditional regulation.  One would expect the low-cost facilities
to have a greater ability to provide reductions without substantial innovation than the high-cost
facility.  A high-cost facility may need to innovate to escape the high costs of routine
compliance; the low-cost facility may have less of a need for this.  The induced innovation
hypothesis, widely employed by economists, suggests that high costs will spur, not deter,
innovation.30  So lowering the cost of routine compliance, through trading or otherwise, does not
encourage innovation.  Trading, by shifting reductions from high-cost to low-cost facilities, may
lessen the net incentives for innovation. 
31 See Malloy, supra note 11, at 537-38, 556.
32 See id. at 557; Jaffe et al., supra note 1, at 44 (discussing how uncertainties can lead to
insufficient investment in innovation).
33 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl.
Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 528 (2d Cir. 1994). For a discussion of some of the technological
issues, see JAMES J. MACKENZIE, THE KEYS TO THE CAR: ELECTRIC AND HYDROGEN
VEHICLES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1994). 
34 See generally MICHEAL SHNAYERSON, THE CAR THAT COULD: THE INSIDE STORY
OF GM’S REVOLUTIONARY ELECTRIC VEHICLE (1996) (detailing innovations and the role of the
ZEV mandate in stimulating them). 
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High local control costs often serve as the catalyst for innovation. Companies do not
routinely pursue all innovations.31 Investigation of innovation often involves substantial
investment without certainty about pay-off.32 Many companies’ management structures further
discourage environmental innovation because environmental projects must compete with other
more favored projects for company resources needed to investigate and implement the
innovation.  When companies face either the impossibility of compliance without innovation or
very high control costs, however, the environmental compliance division acquires some
bargaining power to secure resources to investigate innovation.  Absent such incentives,
companies will tend to comply or over-comply through application of routine technology.  
Some analysis of the low emissions vehicle (LEV) program, a regulatory program that
several states have enacted to stimulate innovation and secure emission reductions from
automobiles, illustrates the way emissions trading may decrease incentives for innovation.  The
program requires introduction of a fairly large number of vehicles that must meet emission
standards that car manufacturers can realize with fairly modest technological improvements,
such as introduction of very efficient catalysts.  But the program also requires introduction of a
small number of zero emission vehicles (ZEVs), most likely electric cars.33 The automobile
industry claims that the ZEVs will prove expensive to produce. One could, in theory, design a
program that provides the same net emission reductions as the LEV program by requiring more
widespread implementation of the emission reduction requirements other than the zero emissions
mandate as the basis for a trading program.  In the short run at least, this would produce, in
theory, the same emission reductions for less cost. But the zero emissions mandate provides the
incentive to develop new technologies that may revolutionize the environmental performance of
automobiles over time and even lower long-term costs.34 Hence, there is a tradeoff between the
short term efficiency that emissions trading promotes and the desire to promote environmentally
superior technological innovation. 
Another example comes the use of international emissions trading programs to meet
climate change goals.  The European Union is adopting trading programs that may make it
possible for electric utilities, significant sources of greenhouse gases, to claim credits undertaken
abroad as a substitute for making reductions below current levels at home. If European states
35 See generally, At Last, The Fuel Cell, ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 1997, at 89; Andrew C.
Revkin, Under Solar Bill, Homeowners Could Cut Electricity Cost to Zero, N.Y. TIMES, July 25,
1996, at B1. 
36 See, e.g., James T. B. Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Developing
a Successful Transferable Rights Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 374 (1989).
37 See Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1985) (“Given a fixed supply of permits . . . [t]he system will
ensure that we . . . keep in place.”). 
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imposed strict reduction requirements upon electric utilities, they might have to switch fuels in
order to meet the requirements. They might need to switch from coal to natural gas to meet fairly
stringent reduction targets and very strict standards might drive them toward innovative
technologies, such as almost-zero polluting fuel cells and solar energy.35 But trading may allow
them to avoid significant changes. Utility operators may eschew expensive innovation to meet a
strict reduction target at home in favor of upgrading a very dirty plant abroad with off-the-shelf
technology at very modest cost, or better yet, claim credits for tree planting projects of uncertain
benefit.  
Some writers have suggested that emissions trading provides a continuing incentive to
reduce “because the number of permits remain limited.”36 Hence, economic growth will increase
the demand for permits, raise the price, and provide a greater incentive for polluters to reduce
their emissions. 
Limiting the number of permits does not create an incentive for continuous net emission
reductions below the equilibrium level required by the program. Limiting the number of total
permits without decreasing the amount of emissions the permits allow would involve tolerating
increases in emissions attributable to economic growth to the extent that existing polluters
generate compensating pollution reductions (credits). Net emissions would remain consistent
with those authorized by the promulgated emission limits, but would not decrease below that
level.37
A legal rule limiting the number of permits creates incentives to avoid increases above
the mandated level, whether or not the permits can be traded. The premise that a trading program
limits the number of permits tacitly assumes that a legal rule prohibits the sources of additional
pollution caused by economic growth from operating without purchased emission allowances.
An argument that a trading program restrains growth in emissions from economic growth also
requires an assumption that the trading regime imposes a cap on the mass of emissions of the
sources within a trading program (as in the acid rain program). A program authorizing trading to
meet rate-based emission limitations or allowing any pollution source to operate without
purchased allowances would tolerate increases in emissions associated with economic growth
38 See Swift, supra note 3, at 18 (explaining that emission rates do not necessarily prevent
increases in the mass of emissions).
39 The traditional program would simply duplicate the assumptions implicit in the trading
model Tripp and Dudek tacitly advance. The government would set mass based emission
limitations for pollution sources, something that must occur in the trading program as well. The
same background legal rule would apply prohibiting the government from granting permits to
new sources of emissions.  
40 See, e.g. Reynolds Metal Co. v. E.P.A, 760 F.2d 549, 559 n.14 (4th Cir. 1985)
(discussing EPA’s promulgation of mass-based standards for total toxic organics (TTO) for the
can-making industry); Citizens for a Better Environment-California v. Union Oil Co. of
California, 861 F.Supp. 889, 895 (N.D.Cal.1994) (discussing mass-based limits on the amount of
selenium that refineries could discharge).
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without demanding compensating credits.38 So even the modest argument that trading can
restrain growth in emissions applies only to a particular idealized trading program, not emissions
trading in general. 
A traditional regulatory program that prohibits economic growth from creating additional
emissions would, in theory, also provide a continuing incentive to avoid net emission increases
in response to economic growth.39 Of course, traditional regulations can limit pollution by mass
rather than by rate, and sometimes has.40  Hence, traditional regulation and emissions trading
based on rates fail to constrain emissions in the face of growth in production, but limits on mass,
whether expressed in performance standards or tradable allowances, may constrain emissions in
the face of growth. A legal rule prohibiting all non-permitted emissions would improve the
environmental performance of either an emissions trading scheme or traditional regulation. But
even an idealized emissions trading program does not provide a more continuous incentive for
pollution reduction than a comparable traditional regulation.
One might support the idea that trading provides superior incentives for innovation by
pointing out that once a planned reduction goal is met, the government can always set another
more ambitious reduction goal.  If the government could be counted on to continuously revise
standards, then a continuous incentive to reduce would exist. But notice that this would be true
whether or not the government authorized trading as the means of meeting the continuously
revised goal. Even without trading, a government program that could be reliably counted upon to
makes its requirements more stringent would provide an incentive for continuous reductions. 
But a major critique of traditional regulation holds that it fails to provide an incentive for
continuous environmental improvement, precisely because the government cannot be depended
upon to strengthen standards in a predictable manner.  Problems of complexity, uncertainty, and
delay prevent regulators from predictably tightening limits. These problems limit traditional
regulation’s ability to stimulate innovation. Does emissions trading overcome this problem?
The answer seems to be no. If an administrative body sets the limits underlying a trading
41 See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1036-1040 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(reciting some of litigious history of this emissions trading program, prior to remanding EPA’s
rule calling on states to adopt an emissions trading program). In fact, EPA’s rulemaking in this
case does not create the emissions trading program directly, but relies upon subsequent state
implementing rules. In addition, a long effort to negotiate this program precedes the event
recited in the opinion. 
42 Jeanne M. Dennis, Smoke for Sale: Paradoxes and Problems of the Emissions Trading
Program of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1105 (1993) (if the
need for reduction in acid rain becomes more urgent, allowances might be confiscated, thus
upsetting the market); Suzi Clare Kerr, Contracts and Tradeable Permit Markets in International
and Domestic Environmental Protection 6 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University)
(because of high levels of scientific uncertainty and changing preferences regulatory systems
must periodically readjust targets). Professor Stewart envisions “depreciating permits” over time
according to a predetermined schedule. See Stewart, supra note 9, at 1333. He suggests that this
proposal would obviate the need for “constant administrative or legislative tightening.” Id. at
1332-33. 
Emissions trading schemes that do not have a fixed long-term depreciation schedule still
may require periodic tightening. A long-term depreciation schedule can be applied to either
marketable or unmarketable permits. Hence, whatever certainty this idea might create would
exist with or without emissions trading. Professor Stewart’s proposal may make sense. But it’s
not really an argument about emissions trading.  
43 See Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (involving
claim seeking additional emission allowances); Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 58 F.3d
643, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same); Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 526, 526 (7th Cir.
1994) (same); Monongahela Power Co. v. Reilly, 980 F.2d 272, 272-74 (4th Cir. 1992) (same). 
44 See David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air
Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740, 808, 815 (1983). Professors Stewart and Ackerman seem to have
assumed that Congress would always set the limits associated with emissions trading. See
Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 190.
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program, then the problems of the complexity of administrative environmental decisionmaking
and the attendant delay may infect these decisions, just as they infect decisionmaking in
traditional programs.  A good example comes from Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
efforts to foster a regional market for nitrogen oxides across a broad region of ozone transport,
which has been plagued by delays and uncertainty.41 The resulting uncertainty can lessen
incentives to innovate, just as uncertainty about future emission limitations reduces such
incentives in traditional regulation.42  Also, private parties have significant incentives to litigate
disliked stringency determinations and allocation decisions.43
Congressional mandates of specific emission reductions may circumvent some of the
problems with administrative decisionmaking, including hard look judicial review.44 Congress
has, in fact, circumvented administrative problems by mandating specific cuts of named
45 See 42 U.S.C. §7651(b)(setting goal of acid rain trading program at a cut of ten million
tons of sulfur dioxide).
46 See 42 U.S.C. §§7521(g)(setting numerical standards for vehicle emissions)
7511a(b)(1)(generally requiring states to cut volatile organic compounds by 15% from 1990
levels).
47 See David M. Driesen, Loose Canons: Statutory Construction and the “New”
Nondelegation Doctrine, 66 PITT. L. REV. 1, 65-67 (2002) (describing constraints on
congressional time as a barrier to specific legislation).
48 See David M. Driesen, Five Lessons From Clean Air Act Implementation, 14 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 53-55 (1997).
49 See, e.g., Brian Doherty, Selling Air Pollution, 28 REASON 32 (1996) (discussing
vigorous industry efforts to influences baselines for California’s Reclaim program, a leading
emissions trading effort).
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pollutants both through emissions trading45 and through standard setting.46  The scarcity of
congressional time may limit the frequency of congressional mandates.47 However,
congressionally set limits have often fared relatively well and should be pursued.48 Yet the
advantages of specific quantitative congressional decisionmaking occur whether or not pollution
sources may use trading as a means to comply with the limits. 
Hence, the intuition that trading programs are easier to establish and change than
traditional programs rests upon confusion of institutional choice with instrumental choice.
Administrators establishing trading programs face many of the same problems that have
interfered with efforts to make non-trading programs predictable stimulants of continuous
innovation. And Congress, to the extent it avoids political paralysis, can overcome these
problems with either trading or non-trading programs.
Some analysts believe that trading programs may prove easier to establish, because
lowered cost will translate into lowered polluter resistance.  But polluters with high local
pollution control costs may not have information about lower cost options at other facilities, and
may therefore fight just as hard as ever.  Much will depend, however, upon political
circumstances.  Polluters will lobby if the potential gains from doing so make it worthwhile,
regardless of whether the potential maximum loss has diminished.  Often, even if polluters
anticipate fully the reduced cost from trading, potential gains from avoiding limits or weakening
them may often provide sufficient incentives for vigorous advocacy sufficient to stall progress.49  
Certainly, no rule exists that trading automatically leads to tightened limits.  
In any case, most claims that trading encourages innovation have not relied upon political
economy arguments hypothesizing tighter limits.  Rather, they have rested upon inherent
characteristics of trading that apply even when they aim at identical limits to those used in a
traditional regulation.  Hence, this identical limits framework, putting political economy
questions aside for the time being, is the framework employed here.     
2.  The Theory of Traditional Regulation:  The Command and Control/Economic
Incentive Dichotomy and the Law
50 See Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 1, at 220; Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester,
Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA’s Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J.
ON REG. 109, 109 (1989). 
51 See, e.g., Hahn & Hester, supra note 50, at 109 (“command and control regulations . . .
specify the methods and technologies that firms must use to control pollution”). See also Dudek
& Palmisano, supra note 1, at 220.
52 See DRIESEN, supra note 8, at 183-87 (discussing error of treating regulations not
encouraging innovation well as “barriers to innovation”).
53 See United States v. Ethyl Corp., 761 F.2d 1153, 1157 (5th Cir. 1985);42 U.S.C. §§
7521(g); 7502(c)(1); Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 184-85 (6th Cir. 1986).
54 See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 1, at 5-6 (“A performance standard typically identifies
a specific goal . . . and gives firms some latitude in meeting this target. These standards do not
specify the means, and therefore, provide greater flexibility. . . .”); Stewart, supra note 9, at 1268
(“Performance standards allow regulated firms flexibility to select the least costly or least
burdensome means of achieving compliance.”) Cf. Stewart, supra note 1, at 158 (“Regulatory
commands dictate specific behavior by each plant, facility, or product manufacturer . . . .”).
55 LOUIS TORNATZKY & MITCHELL FLEISCHER, THE PROCESSES OF TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION 101 (1990); Malloy, supra note 11, at 546-547 & n.52 (performance standards
have the express purpose of “encouraging innovation”).
56 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(h)(1); 7412(d)(2)(D), (h)(1)-(2), (h)(4).
57 See 42 U.S.C. §§7412(h)(3); 7411(h)(3).
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Most analysts employ a simplistic command and control/economic incentive dichotomy
as a substitute for cogent analysis.  They claim that traditional regulation discourages
innovation.50 Indeed, some of the less careful writing states that standard regulation prohibits
innovation.51 If this were true, emissions trading obviously would encourage innovation better
than traditional regulation. 
While the claim that traditional regulation often does not stimulate innovation has great
merit, the view that it prohibits or blocks innovation altogether involves gross exaggeration and
some significant misunderstandings.52 These misunderstandings interfere with sound comparison
of traditional regulation with emissions trading. 
Environmental statutes usually encourage performance standards--a form of a standard
that specifies a level of environmental performance53 rather than the use of a particular
technique.54 Performance standards may encourage innovation by allowing polluters to choose
how to comply.55
Many statutory provisions severely restrict EPA’s authority to specify mandatory
compliance methods, often by requiring a performance standard unless EPA finds that one
cannot measure emissions directly to determine compliance.56 Even when the statutes permit
work practice standards or other types of standards that do command specific control techniques,
the statutes often require EPA to approve adequately demonstrated alternatives.57 
58 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §7412(d)(2); Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 180 (6th Cir.
1986); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 628-29 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
59 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 360-69 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Usually
statutory provisions do allow EPA to take cost and some other factors into consideration. See,
e.g., id. at 319-336.
60 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §1314(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A); E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Train, 430
U.S. 112, 122 & n.9 (1977); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 787 F.2d 965, 972 (5th Cir.
1986); Association of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 1980); American Paper
Inst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328, 340-42 (D.C. Cir. 1976); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526
F.2d 1027, 1045 (3d. Cir. 1975), modified, 560 F.2d 589 (3d. Cir. 1977).
61 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 15-21
(1981).
62 Compare Hahn & Stavins, supra note 1, at 5 with Bruce A. Ackerman & William T.
Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L. J. 1466, 1481-88 (1980)
(discussing NSPS that allegedly mandated flue gas scrubbing); ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra
note 61, at 15-21 (same).
63 Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
64 Id. at 324, 327-28, 340-43, 346-47. 
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This predominance of performance-based standards over command-and-control
regulation exists regardless of the criteria used to determine the standards’ stringency. Statutory
provisions requiring technology-based standards, for example, instruct implementing agencies to
set standards that are achievable with either existing or, in some cases, future technology.58
Hence, agency views concerning technological capability help determine the standards’
stringency.59 Owners of pollution sources may generally use any adequate technology they
choose to comply with the performance standards that an agency has developed through the
evaluation of a reference technology.60
Professor Ackerman’s detailed study of a particularly controversial new source
performance standard (NSPS) under the 1977 Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments may have
indirectly contributed to frequent characterization of technology-based standards as “command
and control” regulation.61 Economists accustomed to a static framework of analysis read
Professor Ackerman’s statements that this NSPS involved “forced scrubbing” as indicating that
“technology-based standards identify particular equipment that must be used to comply with the
regulation.”62 This NSPS, however, allowed utilities to meet their emission limitations through
innovative means, although it precluded complete reliance upon techniques that could not meet
the emission limitations.
This NSPS limited sulfur dioxide emissions to 1.2 pounds (lbs.) per million British
thermal units (MBtu).63 It also required a 90% reduction from uncontrolled levels except for
plants emitting less than 0.6 lbs./MBtu.  These cleaner plants needed only to meet a 70%
reduction requirement.  Nothing in the regulation specifically required any particular technology,
such as wet scrubbing. Indeed, EPA specifically designed the regulation to leave open
opportunities for plants to meet the standards through dry scrubbing and other alternatives that
EPA regarded as somewhat experimental.64 Hence, if a plant operator developed some
65 See id. at 368-73; Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 62, at 1481; Bruce A. Ackerman &
William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Reply, 90 YALE L. J. 1412, 1421-22 n.43 (1981). Cf.
Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards
and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1277 n.41 (1985) (noting that
standard allows using coal washing as offset, decreasing the percentage reduction needed from
scrubbing); ACKERMAN & HASSLER, note 51, at 15, 66-68 (noting that coal washing reduces any
given emissions base by only 20-40%, but replacing new source standards with less stringent
reduction requirement that also applies to existing sources would produce better results)
66 Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 316 (emphasis added).
67 See Kerr, supra note 42, at 66.
68 Hahn & Hester, supra note 50, at 111 (monitoring and enforcement issues play critical
role in efficient design of emissions trading); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not so
Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 748-49
(1991) (“[E]missions trading and pollution taxes require inspectors to monitor constantly the
amount of pollution that a plant emits.”); Stewart, supra note 1, at 161, 166.
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completely new approach that met these standards, the utility could use it.
Operators probably could not meet this standard solely through the use of coal washing,
because coal washing, which was not a new innovation at the time, probably could not produce a
70% reduction by itself.65 Reading Professor Ackerman’s reference to the NSPS as a standard
based on “full scrubbing” to indicate that the NSPS precluded subsequent innovations meeting
the numerical standards would involve technical misunderstanding of the regulation. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit explained in reviewing this NSPS that
“given the present state of pollution control technology, utilities will have to employ some form
of . . . scrubbing.”66 This necessarily implies that if utilities can develop a new technology that
meets the required emission limit, nothing in the regulation precludes its use, a conclusion that
necessarily flows from the numerical limits stated in the standard in any case.
 This error reflects a habit of thinking in static terms. Thinking in more dynamic terms
about the possibility of new technology makes it impossible to equate the NSPS Ackerman
studies with specification of a technology. 
A static frame of reference has frequently led to characterization of technology-based
regulation as “command-and-control” regulation. This term is misleading, except as applied to
the relatively rare standards that actually specify techniques rather than just performance levels.
Moreover, emissions trading cannot substitute for true command-and-control regulation,
regulation that requires specific techniques.67 The law only authorizes command-and-control
regulation when measurement of emissions is impossible. Trading, however, relies upon good
monitoring.68  When good measurement proves impossible, trading will not succeed. 
The incorrect suggestion that traditional regulation generally requires government-chosen
technology would lead to a conclusion that traditional regulation legally forbids innovation. But
some have made more subtle incentive-based arguments for characterizing traditional regulation
as discouraging innovation. 
69 Stewart, supra note 9, at 1269.
70 Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 2, at 302 n.65; Nicholas A. Ashford & George R.
Heaton Jr., Regulation and Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry, 46 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., 109, 139-40 (1983).
71 See Jaffe et al., supra note 1, at 55 (because of a “paucity of available data,” there has
been “exceptionally little empirical analysis” of instrument choice’s effect upon innovation.);
Malloy, supra note 11, at 547 (empirical evidence provides “inconclusive evidence of significant
environmental innovation under existing trading programs.”)
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The fundamental notion that economic incentives are powerful would suggest that
polluters have substantial economic incentives to use the flexibility that performance standards
offer to employ innovative means of meeting emission limitations that are less costly than
traditional compliance methods. Such use of innovations saves polluters money. This incentive
exists even for technology-based performance standards that did not contemplate the innovative
compliance mechanism a polluter discovers. 
Professor Richard Stewart of New York University, however, has stated that polluters
have “strong incentives to adopt the particular technology underlying” a technology-based
performance standard because “its use will readily persuade regulators of compliance.”69 He
does not explain why this countervailing persuasion incentive would overcome the economic
incentive to realize savings through an effective and cheaper innovation, even if the
persuasiveness incentive were powerful.  Polluters, after all, have a number of means of
persuading regulators that their innovations perform adequately if they in fact do so.  First,
polluters may monitor their pollution directly to demonstrate compliance.  Second, in some cases
polluters may eliminate regulated chemicals, which certainly demonstrates compliance. 
Traditional regulation offers ample incentives for pollution prevention eliminating chemicals or
reducing them below regulatory thresholds, because of the substantial savings involved.  While
the uncertainty of innovation’s outcome may discourage innovation under traditional regulation,
in spite of opportunities for cost savings, it may do the same thing with respect to emissions
trading, in spite of the opportunity for some profits from “extra” reductions.  
In any case, neither Professor Stewart nor anybody else has come forward with empirical
evidence that polluters with compliant and cheap innovations have failed to employ them
because of fears of permitting difficulties under a performance standard.70  Indeed, as we shall
see, the empirical record shows that at least on some occasions, this negative incentive, if it
exists, has been overcome. 
III.  Empirical Evidence
The literature, however, gives the impression that solid empirical proof supports
emissions trading’s superiority in stimulating innovation. The literature discusses two types of
evidence, both surprisingly thin:71 Evidence that traditional regulation does not simulate
innovation and evidence that emissions trading does.  In fact, what the literature shows is
something much less dramatic, that both trading and traditional regulation sometimes stimulate
72 See Kurt Strasser, Cleaner Technology, Pollution Prevention, and Environmental
Regulation, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 1, 32 (1997) (innovation sometimes results from emission
and discharge limits).  See, e.g., U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
GAUGING CONTROL TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATORY IMPACTS IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH--AN APPRAISAL OF OSHA’S ANALYTICAL APPROACH, OTA-ENV-635, at 64
(U.S. Government Printing Office 1995) [hereinafter OTA STUDY]; Ashford & Heaton Jr., supra
note 70, at 109, 139-40. 
73 OTA STUDY, supra note 72, at 89. Nicholas A. Ashford et al., Using Regulation to
Change the Market for Innovation, 9 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 419, 440-41 (1985).
74 OTA STUDY, supra note 72, at 90.
75 Id. at 95. OSHA anticipated this possibility, but not the extent to which it dominated
compliance strategies.
76 See Strasser, supra note 72, at 28-29. 
77 See OZONE DEPLETION IN THE UNITED STATES: ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS (Elizabeth
Cook, ed. 1996). 
78 See id. at 14-15, 23-26, 58-60, 90-94, 98-104, 109.
79 See U.S. EPA, Benefits of the CFC Phaseout, at
http://www.epa.gov/ozone/geninfo/benefits.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2001)(citing “aqueous
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innovation and sometimes do not.  
A.  Traditional Regulation 
The empirical literature on traditional regulation shows that industry sometimes chooses
techniques different from those an agency relies upon in standard setting.72 Because so many
studies claim that traditional regulation, usually described as command-and-control regulation,
thwarts innovation, a brief review of some of the cases where this simply has not proven true
seems worthwhile. Most industry responded to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration’s (OSHA’s) and EPA’s regulation of vinyl chloride in ways that the agencies
anticipated. But a proprietary “stripping process,” commercialized within a year of
promulgation, significantly improved polyvinyl chloride resin production while lowering vinyl
chloride exposure, and industry adopted a number of other innovations as well.73 Textile
manufacturers met OSHA’s cotton dust standard, to a significant extent, through modernization
of equipment unanticipated by the government, which was needed anyway to compete with
foreign companies.74 While a few metal foundries responded to standards for formaldehyde in
the workplace through ventilation and enclosure (as expected by OSHA), most developed low-
formaldehyde resins.75  Similarly, while most established smelters responded to sulfur dioxide
limits by using available technologies, copper mining firms developed a new, cleaner, process to
assist their entry into the smelting business.76  These examples show that traditional regulation
can encourage pollution prevention.  
Industry responded to a ban upon ozone depleting chemicals with a variety of
innovations.77  The makers of ozone depleting substances developed new chemicals that
damaged the ozone layer less severely.78 And many former users of ozone depleters simply
substituted soap and water for chemical solvents.79 Operators of chloralkali plants responded to
cleaning” as an example of a cleaning process that reduced cost in phasing out CFCs); ICOLP
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, ELIMINATING CFC-113 AND METHYL CHLOROFORM IN PRECISION
CLEANING OPERATIONS 114 (1994) (defining “aqueous cleaning” as cleaning parts with water
to which suitable detergents, sapnifers or other additives may be added).
80 See Ashford et al., supra note 73, at 437 (describing separation of process from cooling
water to reduce contact with mercury as a “significant process innovation.”).
81 Thomas O. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in Environmental Regulation, 27
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943, 947 (1994) (discussing experience with lead and pesticide bans).
82 See generally ADAM B. JAFFE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS: WHAT DOES THE EVIDENCE TELL US? (1993)
(regulation’s economic impact to minor to have great impact upon competitiveness). See also
STEPHEN M. MEYER, ENVIRONMENTALISM AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY: TESTING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT HYPOTHESIS (Oct. 5, 1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
83 See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, BARRIERS TO ENVIRONMENTAL
TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND USE (1998).
84 See Malloy, supra note 11, at 549-550; Ashford et al., supra note 73, at 432-444
(discussing examples); McGarity, supra note 81, at 945-52 (discussing experience with lead and
pesticide bans).
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EPA regulation of mercury with some process innovations.80 When EPA began phasing out
mirex (a pesticide that controlled fire ants), EPA had registered no acceptable substitutes.  But
during a two-year phase-out period four companies sought registration of substitutes.81 Clearly
the claim that traditional regulation always discourages innovation is simply wrong.
These examples do not, however, show that traditional regulation regularly stimulates
innovation. While evidence on this subject is actually thin because of the scarcity of post-
compliance studies, most traditional regulation probably does little to stimulate innovation. Most
of this regulation allows polluters to meet the standard through relatively cheap existing
technology.82 This “mediocre regulation” does not require stringent pollution reductions that
would make conventional techniques either insufficient or very expensive.83 By contrast, when
government imposes very stringent regulation, companies tend to innovate because the
conventional approaches become either inadequate or expensive.84
B.  Emissions Trading
The evidence regarding emissions trading establishes that it, like traditional regulation,
sometimes encourages innovation, but sometimes does not. A brief review of some of the
principal programs follow.
 1.  Bubbles: Inadequate Environmental Performance
Bubble programs allow plant operators to trade emission reductions among polluting
units within a plant. The empirical literature raises especially serious questions about whether
85 See RICHARD A. LIROFF, AIR POLLUTION OFFSETS: TRADING SELLING AND
BANKING 28-29 (1980) (noting the need to avoid “paper offsets,” reductions in emissions that
exist only on paper). See generally Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 1, at 236-237 (noting that
emissions trading has been the “harbinger of bad news”). 
86 For example, when EPA and its California counterpart inspected plants to verify
compliance with bubble regulations for the aerospace industry in the late 1980s, they found that
“almost all large sources operating under . . . bubbles . . . are not achieving the emission
reductions or levels of control that are required.” See California Air Resources Board and U.S.
EPA, Phase III Rule Effectiveness Study of the Aerospace Coating Industry 4 (1990)
(unpublished report on file with author); See also David Doniger, The Dark Side of the Bubble, 4
ENVTL. F. 33, 34-35 (1985); RICHARD A. LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION:
THE TOIL AND TROUBLE OF EPA’S BUBBLE 80-89 (1986) (examples of bubbles that avoided
requirements to reduce actual emission levels). Hahn and Hester have concluded that emissions
trading (defined to include bubbling and netting) has had “a negligible effect on environmental
quality.” Hahn & Hester, supra note 50, at 137. They do not, however, base this assertion on
empirical data. Rather, they rely “on the fact that the rules governing the various trading
programs contain prohibitions against trades that would result in significant increases in
emissions.” Id. at 137 n.146. They do not explain the basis for their belief that these rules are
adequate and the implicit assumption that they have been regularly and correctly enforced. In
any case, subsequent experience suggests they have not prevented abuse. 
87 Dr. Liroff provides many examples of these bubbles. See LIROFF, supra note 86, at 62-
67, 89-91.
88 See ID. at 37-38 (describing genesis of the bubble idea in the steel industry). 
89 ID. at 100 (most “innovations”under bubbles are merely rearrangements of
conventional technologies). 
90 See ID. at 99 (“cost saving approaches are not necessarily more cost-effective ways of
meeting a goal, instead, they may be ways to avoid costs that may be necessary to meet the
goal”); Richard A. Liroff, Point and Counterpoint: The Bubble: Will it Float Free or Deflate, 4
ENVTL. F. 28, 30 (Mar. 1986) (stating that a compliance method that relaxes regulatory
requirements at some points without compensating reductions may be more prevalent than
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bubbles have spurred adequate environmental performance.85 The few studies of bubble
implementation reveal that polluters often could not document claims that they had made
required emission reductions.86 Where polluters could verify claimed reductions, they often
involved using credits from activities that would have occurred anyway to justify escape from
pollution reduction obligations that would have otherwise generated additional pollution
reductions.87 Hence, gaming has been a problem.
EPA introduced bubbles primarily as deregulatory mechanisms88 and they have often
stimulated neither innovation nor adequate environmental performance at a cheaper price.89
Rather, they have generated cost savings for industry, often by allowing unverifiable claims of
compliance and paper credits to substitute for actual emission reductions and by reducing
pollution reduction demands.90 
bubbles that reduce actual emissions); David D. Doniger, Point . . . And Counterpoint, 4 ENVTL.
F. 29, 34 (“In practice . . . there has been far more innovation in shell games and sharp
accounting practices than in pollution control technology.”); Proposed Open Market Trading
Rule for Ozone Smog Precursors, 60 Fed. Reg. 39668, 39670 (Aug. 3, 1995) (“Bubbles, netting
and offsets have reduced source’s overall compliance costs. However, there have been
significant problems of quality control, reducing the environmental effectiveness of the
programs.”).
91 For accounts of the program, see Suzi Kerr & David Mare, Market Efficiency in
Tradeable Permit Markets with Transaction Costs: Empirical Evidence from the United States
Lead Phasedown in Kerr, supra note 42; Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable
Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 380-391 (1989);Kerr &
Newell, supra note 5.
92 The introduction of inter-refinery trading into the lead phasedown program probably
slowed the pace of environmental improvement. EPA’s 1985 trading rule actually led to
increased production of leaded gasoline in 1985 (rather than purely unleaded) because the rule
allowed increased production of low lead gasoline to generate credits. See Regulation of Fuels
and Fuel Additives; Banking of Lead Rights, 50 Fed. Reg. 13116, 13119 (Apr. 2, 1985); Hahn &
Hester, supra note 91, at 382 n.125; U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, VEHICLE EMISSIONS:
EPA PROGRAM TO ASSIST LEADED-GASOLINE PRODUCERS 20 (1986) [hereinafter GAO,
VEHICLE EMISSIONS]. EPA’s 1985 lead trading rule supplanted a rule that required refiners to
meet a standard of 1.1 grams of lead per leaded gallon, effective January 1, 1986. 50 Fed. Reg. at
13116. The 1985 trading rule allowed refiners that banked purchased credits to continue
exceeding these limits through the end of 1987. 50 Fed. Reg. at 13177, 13127 (codified at 40
C.F.R. §80.20(e)(2)). Furthermore, in actual implementation inadequate reporting, compliance
verification, and enforcement may have marred environmental performance. See GAO, VEHICLE
EMISSIONS at 3-4, 18-19, 23-24 (citing failure to enforce against 25 potential violators, 49 cases
of claimed credits not matching claimed sales of credits, error rates in reporting between 14%
and 49.2% and no verification of compliance). Cf. Hahn & Hester, supra note 91, at 388, n.146. 
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2.  Lead Phase-Down: A Stringent Limitation Driving Substantial Change
EPA allowed gasoline producers to trade lead allowances during a phase-down of lead
from gasoline.91 The lead phase-down did create a substantial change, the reformulation and then
virtual elimination of leaded gasoline. But the driver for this achievement seems to be the
underlying requirement of a phase-down of lead. Faithful implementation of a traditional phase-
down without trading would probably have produced the same change more quickly.92
Indeed, in a very sophisticated empirical analysis of the lead trading program employing
the Malueg model, economists Suzi Kerr and Richard Newell conclude that “increased
93 See Kerr & Newell, supra note 5, at 320 (emphasis added).
94 Id. at 320.
95 See, e.g., Byron Swift, Command without Control: Why Cap-and-Trade Should
Replace Rate Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31 ELR 10330 (Mar. 2001). 
96 Id. at 10331.
97 Swift does claim that trading was essential to two technologies. Id. at 10338. One of
those “technologies,” trading, is a transaction, not a technology. He does not claim that the other
technology, power shifting, is an innovation. Indeed, the shifting of dispatch orders to use
cleaner units more intensively than dirty units is a well-understood operational option.
98 See generally Malloy, supra note 11, at 548-49 (discussing debate about innovation
under the acid rain program).
99 Other papers also employ very broad definitions of innovation and stop short of
attributing the observed “innovations” to trading alone. For example, Dallas Burtraw describes
various kinds of non-patentable practices as innovations. DALLAS BURTRAW, INNOVATION
UNDER THE TRADABLE SULFUR DIOXIDE EMISSION PERMITS PROGRAM IN THE U.S.
ELECTRICITY SECTOR, 17 (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 00-38, 2000). These
include rather routine adaptations to the opportunity to sell abatement technologies, which one
would expect with a comparably designed performance standard. For example, he describes
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stringency . . . encouraged adoption of lead-reducing technology.”93 They credit the trading with
providing flexibility in the timing and distribution of reductions, which lowered the cost of the
technological transition the stringency of a phase-out brought about.94 
3.  Acid Rain: Little Initial Trading or Innovation
Phase one of the acid rain trading program has produced some changes in scrubber
technology, operational methods, and the use of cleaner coal, which some analysts described as
innovations.95  But at the time that scholars began citing the acid rain programs stimulation of
these methods as evidence that trading stimulates innovation, only 3 of 51 firms used
interfacility trading to meet their reduction obligations (although 30 of the 51 did use some
intrafacility averaging).96 So, analysts should have hesitate to ascribe those results to trading.
Byron Swift of the Environmental Law Institute has claimed that EPA’s old rate-based standards
would not have permitted some of the innovations he identified, but he admits that a mass-based
program without trading would have allowed most of the technologies he identifies as
innovations.97
As a general matter, it’s hard to consider coal scrubbing, use of low sulfur coal, or
dispatch orders favoring cleaner units as innovations, since all of these techniques have been
well understood options for many years.98 Nevertheless, some of the improvements in scrubbing
have received patents, which suggests that they might qualify as genuine innovations.99
laying track and changing the size of trains (to deliver low sulfur coal) as innovations. See id. at
19. He makes no effort to determine whether the minority of firms engaged in trading employed
these “innovations” more vigorously than firms that simply complied as if this were a standard
technology-based performance standard expressed as a mass-based limit. The paper’s
conclusion, consistent with the limitations of this mode of study, does not claim that emissions
trading induced innovation. Instead, he claims that the acid rain program contributes to the
employment of innovation. See id. at 18. But this simply begs the question of whether a mass-
based program with the same limits and no trading would induce as much or more innovation. 
100 See Margaret R. Taylor, Edward S. Rubin, and David A. Hounshell, Regulation as the
Mother of Innovation:  The Case of SO2 Control, 27 LAW & POL’Y 348, 370 (2005).
101 See David Popp, Pollution Control Innovations and the Clean Air Act of 1990, 22 J.
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT 641 (2003).
102 See A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID RAIN
PROGRAM 130 (2000).
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But the most detailed study available comparing innovation in sulfur dioxide control
technology before and after the acid rain program has concluded that “the history of innovation
in SO2  control technology does not support” trading’s superiority in inducing innovation.100 
Similarly, David Popp of the Maxwell School of Citizenship finds that both the acid rain
program and prior traditional regulation encouraged the patenting of new technology.101 Indeed,
he shows that there was more patenting of new environmental technologies prior to the
introduction of the acid rain program. He states, however, that the programs created different
types of technological incentives: the traditional program led to innovations reducing the cost of
scrubbing, while the trading program produced patents improving pollution control
characteristics. Yet this very useful research stops short of proving even the limited proposition
that trading changes the type of innovation. For the non-trading programs that limited sulfur
dioxide emissions prior to 1990 have much laxer limits and a different form of limits than the
trading program enacted in the 1990 Amendments to the CAA. These differences, rather than the
trading, may account for the observed difference. 
In any case, so far the acid rain program has not produced significant diffusion or
creation of much cleaner technologies, such as natural gas power plants or renewable energy, nor
has it resulted in really path breaking radical innovation (such as new designs for fuel cells).102 
This suggests that something other than the mere existence of a trading program may be
important to stimulating meaningful innovation.
4.  State Programs After 1990
Since 1990, states have implemented a variety of emissions trading programs.  These
programs have performed unevenly in a number of respects.  For example, New Jersey
suspended a trading program for poor performance and California’s Reclaim program came
103 See CURTIS MOORE, RECLAIM:  SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA’S FAILED EXPERIMENT
WITH AIR POLLUTION TRADING 2 (2003) (describing RECLAIM as a failure in reducing
emissions); Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice:  Los
Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 231 (1999);
Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; New Jersey; Open Market
Emissions Trading Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 64347 (October 18, 2002) (announcing EPA decision
not to proceed with processing New Jersey SIP revisions, because New Jersey had found such
serious problems in its emissions trading program that it was planning to abandon it). 
104 See NESCAUM, POWER COMPANIES’ EFFORTS TO COMPLY WITH THE NOX  SIP CA;;
AND SECTION 126, 4 (2003) (61 of 100 units with announced commitments have chose selective
catalytic reduction).
105 See Drury et. al., supra note 103, at 258-263 (discussing fraud in the estimation of
credits and debits that systematically undermines environmental performance).
106 See EPA, AN EVALUATION OF SOUTH COST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT’S
REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET-LESSONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS AND
INNOVATION 26-27 (2002).
107 See id. at 21, 27 (relying upon design variables other than the trading possibility to
explain the innovation).
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under heavy fire for reasons of environmental justice and for poor environmental performance.103 
 Facilities have primarily relied upon tried and true control technologies in many of these
programs.  For example, the regional trading program for nitrogen oxide emission reductions
EPA organized to aid state attainment of the old ozone standard produced a large number of
orders for selective catalytic reduction technologies.104  But some sources have relied on less
conventional techniques, such as ThermaloNOx, rotating overfired air, and reburn technology. 
And many RECLAIM sources have relied upon junking of old cars, which seems imaginative,
but hardly constitutes an advanced innovative technology and creates fraud problems.105   EPA’s
evaluation of RECLAIM states that most sources relied upon conventional off-the-shelf
technology, but a few used innovative compliance methods.106  Since very few sources generated
credits through over-compliance to sell into the market, we do not know whether it is correct to
ascribe the innovation that did occur under the RECLAIM program to the program’s
authorization of emissions trading.107 
C.  A Summary of the Empirical Record
I provide all of this evidence to support a very modest assertion: Both traditional
regulation and trading often failed to produce innovation, but sometimes succeeded.  I do not
claim that traditional regulation is free from design flaws or gaming.  Nor do I claim that all
trading programs are bad.  I have offered extensive treatment of a variety of trading programs
only to cure a tendency to compare the best trading program we have ever had, the acid rain
program, to negative stereotypes about traditional regulation.  The proper analysis compares a
108 See Taylor, Rubin, and Hounshell, supra note 100, at 369 (most improvement in sulfur
dioxide control efficiency occurred before the 1990 Amendments).
28
trading program to a traditional regulation with equivalent emission limits.    
IV. Implications
Emissions trading obviously does nothing to encourage expensive innovation--even
innovation that would produce long-term efficiency and enormous environmental improvement.
Nor does either the empirical record or sound economic theory strongly support a milder
conclusion, that emissions trading does a better job of encouraging relatively cheap innovation.
Under traditional regulation, the high cost sources have an incentive to adopt any innovation
promising compliance for less cost than its relatively high cost of control. Under emissions
trading, only innovations costing less than the marginal cost of additional reductions at facilities
with relatively low control costs can find a market. Thus, trading discourages innovation by
lowering the price at which innovation will become economically viable.
A.  A Research Agenda 
I would argue that we need more research on the topic.  Malueg’s model and David
Popp’s empirical work suggest a milder hypothesis than a generic assertion of trading’s
superiority in encouraging innovation: The hypothesis that trading may change the type of
innovation rather than the amount.  The low cost sources under trading have an incentive to
generate extra emission reductions.  High cost sources under comparable traditional regulation
face incentives to adopt innovations that save them money, but not necessarily innovations that
increase control efficiency.  So, polluters may have better incentives to innovate to increase
control efficiency under a trading regime than under traditional regulation, even if overall
incentives for maximizing the number of innovations have declined. 
A recent empirical analysis, however, concludes that more innovation in improving
environmental performance occurred prior to the acid rain program.108  Several reasons exist to
doubt even Popp’s milder thesis.  First, emissions trading creates enormous opportunities to use
a very wide variety of traditional technologies to generate credits while avoiding the uncertainty
involved in innovation. These opportunities may weaken incentives for innovations with greater
control efficiencies. Traditional technologies typically provide excess reductions under
traditional regulation because sources need to make sure that they remain in continuous
compliance. Under trading, polluters using conventional techniques will sell some of this
surplus, thus lessening any demand for innovation. Furthermore, trading provides opportunities
to engage in minor non-innovative tweaking of operating conditions to generate excess emission
reductions. An example involves using dispatch orders from electric utilities to use cleaner units
more extensively. This is hardly innovative, but it does realize some extra emission reductions. 
Trading might well provide good incentives to seize non-innovative (i.e. obvious) pollution
prevention opportunities that provide a small quantity of emission reductions. Finally, the
flexibility for trading may invite use of traditional technologies with relatively weak
environmental performance because every increment has some value. An example involves the
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use of low sulfur coal in the acid rain program. Second, by weakening incentives for cost
reducing innovation at high cost facilities, trading may indirectly limit innovations that will
produce higher control efficiencies. Facilities whose high costs come from exceptionally dirty
processes may adopt new technologies just to meet (not exceed) emission limits at their own
facilities, but these same technologies may provide superior environmental performance at
cleaner facilities.  And new ideas pursued to lower costs may lead to ideas for greater pollution
control.  For a variety of reasons, the hypothesis that emissions trading may systematically
change the type of innovation induced in a desirable manner might not stand. 
This much milder claim about the nature of innovation, however, stands on firmer ground
than the traditional claim that emissions trading spurs more innovation than traditional
regulation.  It certainly merits further research and exploration.  Even if trading turns out to have
some innovation stimulating advantages, trading’s clear inferiority in spurring initially
expensive, but environmentally excellent innovation stands as a significant problem.
The framework for analysis that I have offered points the way toward a research agenda
to explore both Popp’s claims about the nature of innovation under trading and more general
claims about low cost trading.  I have pointed out that when innovation occurs in conjunction
with the trading program, it is very hard to figure out whether the trading or some other feature
of the program explains the observed increase in innovation.  Since empirical analysis shows that
stringent traditional regulation has encouraged innovation, it is possible that when we see
innovation in a trading program, stringent underlying emission limits, not the trading itself,
explain the observed results.  The proper way to test this involves comparing trading programs
based on a set of limits to a non-trading performance standard based on the same limits.  Some
of the analysis of the acid rain program above applies this approach to the acid rain program,
relying primarily on Byron Swift’s analysis.  It may appear, however, that this poses an
impossible challenge for empirical research, since two identical programs may not exist in the
real world.     
It is possible, however, to find this situation in the real world.  Existing analysis reaches
conclusions about innovation by examining compliance choices of pollution sources subject to
trading programs, whether or not they actually trade.  But a pollution source that does not buy or
sell credits has innovated or failed to innovate because of the underlying requirement for
reductions, not because of the incentives provided by trading.  Researchers might compare the
compliance strategies of facilities earning extra credits or buying credits that they eventually sell
in a trading program to the strategies of firms subject to the same program rules that opt for local
compliance without trading.  The trading sources (both buyers and sellers of credits) should
reflect the incentives trading provides, whereas the non-traders choices should provide some
information about how a performance standard without trading would influence compliance
choices.  In this way, we might be able to reach more convincing conclusions about innovation
and trading than we have to date.  
B.  The Importance of Design
  
Framing the question of whether trading improves innovation as requiring a comparison
109 Cf. Kerr & Newell, supra note 5, at 320 (explaining that stringency induced
innovation in the lead program).
110 See Swift, supra note 145; DRIESEN, supra note 8, at 193-197.
111 See DRIESEN, supra note 8.
112 See, e.g., Jaffe et al., supra note 1, at 49. 
113 Cf. Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in
Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV., 313, 348 (1998) (explaining that polluters’
preferences have generally prevented enactment of pollution taxes); James M. Buchanan &
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with an identical performance standard without trading yields important insights. Since both
trading and traditional regulation sometimes stimulates innovation and sometimes does not,
some factors besides instrument choice must influence the degree of innovation.  This Article
has already suggested that the stringency of limits has a large influence.109  In the Economic
Dynamics of Environmental Law, I explain that the form of emission limits matters as well
(building on work by Byron Swift on mass-based limits).110 One would expect that a program
with mass-based limits and relatively stringent targets would produce more innovation than a
rate-based program with lax limits, whether or not trading was used.  In spite of widespread
recognition that good monitoring is essential to trading, EPA has allowed states to continue
programs that do not feature continuous monitoring.  Such programs tend to produce no
innovation and usually fail to produce contemplated environmental improvements.  The
literature’s preoccupation with a simplistic and misleading command and control/economic
incentive dichotomy has led to a failure to adequately address crucial design issues.  Design
considerations such as stringency and the existence of adequate monitoring may matter even
more than the choice between trading and non-trading programs.
C.  Broader Theoretical Implications
The significance of emissions trading’s inferiority in stimulating innovation (especially
expensive innovation) depends upon the value of innovation relative to other factors. Emissions
trading retains significant cost saving advantages over traditional regulation, something that
regulators will take into account. My Economic Dynamics book explains why innovation
deserves more emphasis than it has received, especially with respect to environmental problems
difficult to reverse.111 Leading economists agree that the development and spread of new
technologies “may, in the long run” play a major role in determining the “success or failure of
environmental protection efforts.”112  
While this article has focused primarily upon a comparison between traditional regulation
and emissions trading, a more interesting point may be that both have significant shortcomings
in stimulating innovations, especially radical innovation.  Neither mediocre regulation nor most
emissions trading programs do very well in stimulating radical innovation. They both depend
upon government standard setting, which tends toward demands unlikely to disrupt the status
quo. Pollution taxes would suffer from the same problem.113 Recognizing the weaknesses of
Gordon M. Tullock, Polluters’ Profits and Political Response: Direct Control Versus Taxes, 65
AM. ECON. REV. 139, 141-142 (1975) (explaining why polluters oppose pollution taxes);
Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 2, at 340-343 (describing various impediments to setting tax
rates for pollution).
114 It has received some attention. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 37, at 12 n.31 (fees from
a pollution tax could be used to subsidize pollution reduction); Robert W. Hahn, Economic
Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctor’s Orders, 3 J.
ECON. PERSP. 95, 104-107 (describing effluent taxes dedicated to funding environmental
improvement); MIKAEL SKOU ANDERSEN, GOVERNANCE BY GREEN TAXES: MAKING
POLLUTION PREVENTION PAY (1994) (advocating earmarking of green taxes to fund pollution
reduction).
115 T. H. Tietenburg, Using Economic Incentives to Maintain our Environment,
CHALLENGE, Mar./Apr. 1990, at 42, 43.
116 See Nathanael Greene & Vanessa Ward, Getting the Sticker Price Right: Incentives
for Cleaner, More Efficient Vehicles, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 94-97 (1994). 
117See New Hampshire Representative Jeffrey C. MacGillivray and Kenneth Colburn,
Director, New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services, A New Approach to Air
Pollution Regulation, Industry-Average Performance Systems (IAPS) (1997) (on file with
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trading and other oft-discussed approaches in stimulating innovation should make us eager to
explore more imaginatively the possibilities for more creative use of economic incentives. 
We can design more dynamic economic incentives that encourage competition to reduce
pollution, much as the free market creates competition to provide better amenities. This requires
creation of mechanisms that circumvent the need for repeated government decisions and allow
private actions, rather than government decisions, to stimulate reductions in pollution. 
The law can apply either positive economic incentives (revenue increases or cost
decreases) or negative economic incentives (revenue decreases or cost increases) to polluters.
This reveals a possibility that has received too little attention.114 Negative economic incentives
can fund positive economic incentives. 
Governments have designed programs that use negative economic incentives to fund
positive economic incentives. New Zealand addressed the depletion of its fishery by imposing
fees on fishing (a negative economic incentive) and using revenue from these fees to pay some
fishermen to retire (a positive economic incentive). This may reduce pressure on the fish if fees
are high enough.115 The California legislature has considered a program (called Drive ++) that
involves imposing a fee upon consumers purchasing an energy inefficient or high pollution
vehicle and using the proceeds to fund a rebate on the purchase of an energy efficient vehicle or
low polluting vehicle.116 Similarly, New Hampshire officials have proposed an “Industry
Average Performance System” that redistributes pollution taxes to the polluting industry in ways
that favor lower emissions.117 
author). 
118 See TORNATZKY & FLEISCHER, supra note 55, at 168 (intense competition tends to
stimulate spread of innovation). 
119 I have sketched this idea previously in Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 2, at 344-347
and Driesen, supra note 10, at 10288-10230. The idea receives a fuller defense in DRIESEN,
supra note 8, at 151-161, 163, 213. An EPA economist has recently offered a “feebate” proposal
for electric utility that bears some resemblance to my proposal. See Andrew M. Ballard,
Fee/Rebate System May Offer Flexibility in Reducing Emissions, EPA Economist Tells
Conference, 33 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1437 (June 28, 2002).
120 See ANDERSON ET. AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC
INCENTIVES 3-4 (1977).
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 One can build on this principle to craft laws that mimic the free market’s dynamic
competitive character far better than taxes or subsidies. In a competitive free market, a firm that
innovates to reduce its cost or increase its revenues not only increases its profits, it often reduces
its competitors’ profits. Hence, firms in a very competitive market face strong incentives to
innovate and improve.118 Failing to do so can threaten their survival. Doing so can make them
prosper.
One could craft an “environmental competition statute” that requires polluters to pay any
costs that competitors incur in reducing pollution plus a substantial premium, thereby creating a
significant incentive to be among the first to reduce pollution.119 An environmental competition
statute directly attacks a fundamental problem with existing free market incentives: The
polluting firm must bear any cleanup costs itself. Since the firm does not experience all of the
costs of pollution itself (most are externalized and felt by the general public), it rarely pays to
clean up.120 If firms could systematically externalize the costs of cleanup without substantial
administrative intervention, just as they externalize the cost of pollution, then even a fairly
modest premium might create adequate incentives to control pollution. 
 An environmental competition statute would create a private environmental law with a
few public decisions setting up the law, but with substantial enforcement by low polluting
businesses against competitors. The statute would create a private right of action that allowed a
business that realized environmental improvements through investment in pollution reducing (or
low pollution) processes, control devices, products, or services to secure reimbursement for
expenses, plus some premium, from more polluting competitors.  Hence, the scheme would
create economic incentives for some companies to become enforcers of the law, rather than
creating incentives for all companies to resist enforcement.
 
Such a proposal overcomes the fundamental problem with traditional regulation,
emissions trading, and taxes. These mechanisms rely on government decisions as the driver for
pollution reductions. An environmental competition statute makes private initiative, motivated
121 An environmental competition statute might seem to only create incentives to reduce
first and do nothing to motivate reductions from slow movers. But the dynamic such a program
creates, like the dynamic of a free market, works more broadly than that. Nobody would know a
priori who the first movers would be. This means that anybody who didn’t actively seek
emission reductions would risk financial loss of uncertain dimension, precisely the risk
companies face when they fail to innovate in making new products (or improving old ones) in a
competitive market. 
122 Companies might conclude that they would rather collude to avoid such a scheme than
compete to earn money from it. All of the companies subject to the statute could defeat it by
deciding to do nothing. To prevent this collusion, lawmakers might restrict communication
between companies regarding their plans under the law.
123 See, e.g., ‘Clear Skies’ Legislation to Cut Emissions from Power Plants Introduced in
Congress, 33 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1693, 1694 (Aug. 2, 2002) (both Jefford’s bill and Bush
Administration’s Clear Skies proposal rely upon a cap and trade approach, says Holmstead). 
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by the prospect of gain and the fear of loss, the driver of environmental improvement, thus
replicating free market dynamics.121 The magnitude of the incentive may depend upon the extent
of industry fears about competitors’ achievements rather than the fixed cost directly imposed by
government.
Moreover, such a scheme provides a continuous incentive to reduce pollution. Any
company can profit by making an environmental improvement or lose money by failing to make
one.122 The government does need to establish the premium to be paid to first movers. But once it
established this, repeated government decisions are not necessary. Securing maximum incentives
for innovation may require legal structures that induce competition to produce environmental
improvement and lessen the need for repeated government decisions.
I do not mean to suggest that the environmental competition statute offers the only
possible approach to inducing innovation.  For example, government research and subsidies may
have a legitimate and important role to play, or may be ineffective because of special interest
capture.  But I do wish to suggest that a recognition of trading’s limits in stimulating innovation
should encourage a more imaginative exploration of potential alternatives.   
Conclusion
Emissions trading certainly does a poor job in stimulating radical innovation and other
relatively expensive (but potentially valuable) innovation.  It may stimulate less innovation than
a comparably designed traditional regulation.  As a result, we should think more critically about
the automatic preference for emissions trading. While policymakers will continue to rely upon
emissions trading in the near future,123 we need more attention to design issues and, in the long
run, creative alternatives to emissions trading.
